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ARTICLE
Taming the snake in paradise: combining institutional design 
and leadership to enhance collaborative innovation
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Intelligence, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA; dSchool of Governance, Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands; 
eDepartment of Sociology and Social Research, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Milan, Italy
ABSTRACT
The growing expectations to public services and the pervasiveness 
of wicked problems in times characterized by growing fiscal con-
straints call for the enhancement of public innovation, and new 
research suggests that multi-actor collaboration in networks and 
partnerships is superior to hierarchical and market-based strategies 
when it comes to spurring such innovation. Collaborative innova-
tion seems ideal as it builds on diversity to generate innovative 
public value outcomes, but there is a catch since diversity may clash 
with the need for constructing a common ground that allows 
participating actors to agree on a joint and innovative solution. 
The challenge for collaborative innovation – taming the snake in 
paradise – is to nurture the diversity of views, ideas and forms of 
knowledge while still establishing a common ground for joint 
learning. While we know a great deal about the dynamics of the 
mutually supportive processes of collaboration, learning and inno-
vation, we have yet to understand the role of institutional design 
and leadership in spurring collaborative innovation and dealing 
with this tension. Building on extant research, the article draws 
suitable cases from the Collaborative Governance Data Bank and 
uses Qualitative Comparative Analysis to explore how multiple 
constellations of institutional design and leadership spur collabora-
tive innovation. The main finding is that, even though certain 
institutional design features reduce the need for certain leadership 
roles, the exercise of hands-on leadership is more important for 







1. Collaborative innovation and the snake in paradise
Until recently, ‘public innovation’ was considered as an oxymoron. Fortunately, new 
research has demolished the longstanding myth that juxtaposes an innovative and 
dynamic private sector with an ossified public sector trapped in red tape, lack of 
incentives and centralized control (Mazzucato, 2013). The public sector is much more 
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innovative than its reputation, and persistently explores and exploits opportunities for 
developing and implementing new ideas that disrupt common wisdom and established 
practices at the level of service production, public policy and societal problemsolving 
(Borins, 2014).
In the last decade, there has been a growing interest in spurring public innovation. 
Globalization and the rapid development of new disruptive technologies force govern-
ments to find new ways of tackling unforeseen problem situations but also create new 
opportunities (Farazmand, 2009). Cross-pressure between the growing service expecta-
tions of increasingly affluent citizens and the increasingly scarce public resources makes 
it difficult to make ends meet without developing and implementing smarter public 
solutions (Torfing, 2019). Wicked and unruly problems such as climate change, obesity 
epidemics, inner-city decay cannot be solved by existing standard solutions, but call for 
out-of-the-box thinking and the creation of new and bold solutions (Ansell & Torfing, 
2014; Crosby, Hart & Torfing, 2017; Hofstad & Torfing, 2017; Meijer, 2019; Seid et al., 
2018).
Given the growing pressure on governments to enhance public innovation, it is 
important to bear in mind that innovation is not a goal in itself, but a means to enhance 
the production of public value (Osborne & Browne, 2011). Indeed, to avoid a blind 
pursuit of innovation for the sake of innovating, we should remember that public 
innovation is not always called for as continuous improvements are sometimes enough 
to deal with emerging problems and challenges. Moreover, the failure rate of innovation 
projects is often high and the outcome is not always desirable and might even be 
catastrophic in particular fields such as traffic regulation, nuclear safety and pension 
systems.
Still, when incremental changes are deemed insufficient to tackle complex problems, 
respond to societal challenges and take advantage of new opportunities, public orga-
nizations must be agile, future-oriented and ready to manage the risks associated with 
innovating their policies, services and organizational support systems. There are 
spectacular examples of innovative political leaders (Polsby, 1984) and public entre-
preneurs (Doig & Hargrove, 1990; Roberts and King, 1996), inspiring reports about 
innovative solutions provided by private contractors (Edquist & Hommen, 1999), and 
strong cases of user-driven innovation (Bisgaard & Høgenhaven, 2010; Von Hippel, 
1986). Nevertheless, recent research bids farewell to the idea of the hero innovator 
(Meijer, 2014; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011) and highlights the fact that public innovation 
is often a result of teamwork and collaborative efforts in networks, partnerships and 
swarms of public and private actors (Ansell & Torfing, 2014; Gloor, 2006; Hartley, 
2005). Entrepreneurial leaders may play a key role in collaborative settings, but 
innovation leadership is often collective, distributed and shared (Bernier & Hafsi, 
2007; Meijer, 2014).
The idea that multi-actor collaboration can spur innovation is well supported by 
innovation system theory (Freeman, 1991; Gloor, 2006; Hekkert et al., 2007) and theories 
of public innovation (Bommert, 2010; Gieske, Buuren and Bekkers, 2016; Hartley, 
Sørensen and Torfing, 2013). Arguments in favor of collaborative innovation include 
the idea that multi-actor collaboration helps to produce a more precise and nuanced 
understanding of the problem at hand, bring forth a greater richness of ideas, stimulate 
mutual learning, facilitate negotiated risk management, build joint ownership over new 
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and bold solutions, enable coordinated implementation and adaptation, and accelerate 
the diffusion of successful innovations (Torfing, 2016).
Collaborative innovation is a complex and risk-prone process, but when successful, it 
may spur the production of public value (Trivellato et al., 2019). Indeed, the focus on 
public value creation is a game-changer since it reveals that a broad range of public and 
private actors can contribute to public value production and thus might be invited to 
participate in collaborative processes aiming to enhance public innovation (Alford, 2010; 
Sørensen & Torfing, 2019). The snake in paradise, however, is that while innovation 
thrives on diversity and the disruption and learning derived from the clash between 
different views, ideas and forms of knowledge, collaboration is often predicated on a high 
degree of commonality between the actors that makes it easier to get along (Torfing, 
2018). Finding a common ground for a diversity of actors to communicate with each 
other and deal constructively with their differences is therefore of key importance to 
collaborative innovation since there is a constant tension between the diversity that is 
needed for creative problem-solving, and the construction of the common ground that is 
needed to actually realize the innovation (Bassett-Jones, 2005; Gray, 1989). This tension 
needs to be dealt with through a combination of institutional design and leadership in 
order to reap the fruits of collaborative innovation. In short, the snake in paradise needs 
to be tamed.
Some researchers have focused on the structural properties of collaborative networks 
and shown how participatory diversity, which enhances expansive learning, and network 
density, which facilitates alignment, spur public innovation in the field of urban planning 
(Dente, Bobbio & Spada, 2005). Other scholars have focused on the basic organizational 
capacity for collaborative innovation (Gieske et al., 2016; Meijer, 2019). An important 
part of this research looks at the role of institutionalization (De Vries et al., 2016; Meijer, 
2019) and institutional design (Ansell & Gash, 2018) that has also been a major theme in 
theories of network governance (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Skelcher, Mathur & Smith, 
2005; Sørensen & Torfing, 2016, 2009). Institutional design refers to the rules, norms and 
procedures that enable and constrain collaborative interaction and the search for and 
implementation of innovative solutions. Recent research shows that the design of colla-
borative chronic care network enhanced collaboration and resulted in innovation (Seid 
et al., 2018), but the empirical evidence gathered from single case studies must be further 
strengthened through comparative case studies.
While institutional design aims to shape the arena for collaborative innovation, the 
exercise of leadership aims to promote, encourage, support and facilitate collaboration 
and to stimulate transformative learning and creative problemsolving (Sørensen & 
Torfing, 2011; Crosby, Hart & Torfing, 2017). Public leaders may play different roles in 
processes of collaborative innovation (Ansell & Gash, 2012; Cristofoli, Trivellato & 
Verzillo, 2019; Trivellato et al., 2019). Sponsors and champions provide support, 
resources and a ‘license to innovate’ and stewards help to protect the integrity of the 
process. Conveners bring actors together, facilitators promote collaboration, and med-
iators aim to solve or mitigate the impact of conflicts. Finally, catalysts aim to disrupt the 
collaborative and cognitive processes in order to get the actors to think out of the box. 
A new empirical study shows that public leaders play a key role in creating and absorbing 
knowledge, integrating different forms of knowledge to create new insights and ideas, 
and reconfiguring knowledge to take into account new developments and events 
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(Trivellato et al., 2019). Another recent study reveals that ‘rotating leadership’, whereby 
leaders alternate between having central or more peripheral positions in teams and 
networks, play a key role in enhancing and mobilizing ‘swarm intelligence’ (Antonacci 
et al., 2017). These results attest to the importance of a leadership and its transformative 
and distributive character.
Despite recent achievements, we need a much deeper understanding of the role of 
institutional design and leadership as approaches for dealing with the tension between 
innovation-enhancing diversity and the common ground that is needed to foster colla-
boration, agreement and joint solutions. Previous studies have tested the independent 
impact of different factors on collaborative outcomes (Provan & Milward, 1995; Turrini 
et al., 2010), but we need to study the effects of competing constellations of factors in 
order to understand how the presence and/or absence of different factors combine to 
produce successful outcomes such as collaborative innovation (Raab, Mannak, & 
Cambré, 2015).
Research on network performance shows that the outcomes of collaborative networks 
are positively affected by resource munificence, a centralized and integrated network 
structure, formal and informal coordination mechanisms, and network management 
(Cristofoli et al., 2014, 2015; Cristofoli and Markovic, 2015; Provan and Milward, 1995; 
Raab et al., 2015). While this finding suggests that features associated with hierarchical 
governance are crucial for enhancing effectiveness and efficiency of collaborative net-
works in the field of policy and service delivery, a different set of factors may be 
conducive for the production of collaborative innovation based on mutual learning 
and creative problem-solving in distributed networks of relevant and affected actors.
To further advance the research on the conditions for collaborative networks to 
produce innovative public value outcomes, we ask the following question: How do 
different forms of institutional design and leadership combine to produce pathways to 
collaborative innovation of public value? To answer this question, we will use a Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) of 32 cases from the Collaborative Governance Data Bank. 
This article first provides a brief account of the theoretical framing of the empirical 
analysis in order to justify the causal links between conditions and outcomes. We then 
present the methodological background for and steps in the Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) that allows us to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
emergence of successful collaborative innovation outcomes. The Methods section is 
followed by a presentation and discussion of our empirical findings. The conclusion 
summarizes the argument and lists a number of future research avenues.
2. Institutional design and leadership as preconditions for collaborative 
innovation
Collaborative innovation denotes a particular strategy for enhancing innovation. 
Innovation in itself is defined as the development and implementation of new solutions 
that break with the dominant ideas and practices in a particular context (Hartley, 2005; 
Torfing, 2018). Collaboration involves a plethora of public and/or private actors in a joint 
effort to transform the state of affairs through sustained interaction based on dialogue, 
contestation and agreement (Gray, 1989). Relations of interdependency and the hope 
that mutual exchange of experiences, ideas and resources will bring forth new and better 
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solutions to common problems or challenges will tend to keep the actors together, despite 
the presence of diverging interests, ideas and forms of knowledge. Diversity may help to 
prevent the development of ‘tunnel vision’ and ‘group think’ and thus spur disruptive 
learning and innovation. However, some studies find that there is a reverse U-shaped 
relation between partner diversity and innovative step change: diversity can both be too 
low and too high (Leeuw, Lokshin, & Duysters, 2014). In order to prevent diversity from 
resulting in either destructive conflicts or a dialogue of the deaf a certain degree of 
alignment between the diverse partners is needed. Requisite alignment can be secured by 
a well-designed and facilitated face-to-face interaction between the partners that over 
time will help to build trust, empathy and mutual understanding that in turn will 
facilitate creative problemsolving and the fostering of a joint agreement on bold solutions 
(Dente, Bobbio and Spada, 2005).
Recent research claims that collaborative innovation has a comparative advantage 
over hierarchical and market-based innovation strategies (Bommert, 2010; Roberts, 
2000; Torfing, 2016). Hierarchical innovation strategies authorize a small group of top- 
level value-driven decision makers to deal with a particular problem and come up with 
a swift solution that is implemented downwards through the chain of command and 
draws on centrally allocated resources. However, the quality of the innovative solution 
will tend to suffer from the failure to solicit input from relevant and affected actors. 
Hence, the solution may not hit the target and solve the problem at hand because the 
problem definition is inadequate, the solution reflects the dominant leadership dis-
course, and its feasibility is low. These problems are partly solved by market-based 
innovation strategies that involve a large number of competing and incentivized actors 
in the design of innovative solutions and allow them to question the solutions preferred 
by established authorities. The winner of the competitive race gets to design the 
innovative solution and receives a reward from the government and/or newly won 
customers. However, while competition may spur innovation, it tends to hamper 
innovation by preventing knowledge sharing and information exchange and wasting 
valuable resources on rivalry and parallel investments in research and development. 
Collaborative innovation both mobilizes the wisdom of the crowd and ensures 
exchange of knowledge, ideas and resources in the joint search for new and better 
solutions. Moreover, it transgresses the organizational boundaries of the public bureau 
and private firm by inviting all actors that possess relevant innovation assets such as 
experience, ideas, resources and courage to participate in the collaborative innovation 
process (Bommert, 2010).
The advantage of collaborative innovation is accompanied by a series of potential 
obstacles. It may prove difficult to motivate relevant and affected actors to participate, the 
transaction costs associated with prolonged interaction are often considerable, the 
participants may have a hard time communicating with and understanding each other 
due to their different vantage points and vocabularies, and destructive conflicts may 
prevent joint dialogue, learning and the fostering of agreement. Moreover, the actors may 
be risk-averse in the face of disruptive innovations and implementation of new solutions 
in loosely coupled networks tends to be tricky due to the absence of stable rules, a clear 
division of labor, and the absence of hierarchical control (O’Toole, 1997). Fortunately, 
institutional design and leadership may help to overcome these problems and spur 
collaborative innovation by creating a framework for empowered participation and 
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sustained collaboration and facilitating alignment, learning and join decision-making 
(Torfing, 2016).
Alexander defines institutional design as ‘the devising and realization of rules, proce-
dures, and organizational structures that will enable and constrain behavior and action so 
as to accord with held values, achieve desired objectives, or execute given tasks’ 
(Alexander, 2005, p. 213). This definition covers the various accounts of institutional 
design advanced by different strands of the new institutionalism (Peters, 2012). At a more 
concrete level, institutional design involves the selection of participants, the creation of 
a regulatory framework for collaborative interaction, and the formation of procedures for 
making and tracking joint decisions and their outcomes.
Leadership in public organizations is normally defined as the attempt to achieve 
a particular set of goals with and through others by means of influencing their motiva-
tion, steering their attention, and directing their efforts (Jensen et al., 2019). In the 
context of collaborative innovation, this type of directional leadership is less pronounced. 
Hence, leadership has to be re-conceptualized as the adaptive activities to bring actors 
together, create trust, enhance information sharing, facilitate collaboration, spur mutual 
learning, manage risks, and track results (Crosby & Bryson, 2010; Morse, 2010, Silvia & 
McGuire, 2010). Such leadership activities are often performed collectively, distributed 
among several actors or shared between a group of actors appointed by the key partners 
in the collaboration (Bolden 2011; Ospina, 2017; Meijer, 2014; Provan & Kenis, 2008). In 
principle, leadership can be performed by both public and private actors, but the public 
actors often have an advantage as they have the centrality, authority, resources and 
organizational backup needed to lead collaborative innovation.
While we know a great deal about how institutional design and leadership affect the 
ability of collaborative networks to coordinate and provide public services in an effective 
manner, we know much less about how institutional design and leadership of collabora-
tive networks enhance innovation. In order to deepen our understanding of how 
different combinations of institutional design and leadership support processes of colla-
borative innovation and produce successful outcomes, we shall first make the following 
conjectures.
First, concerning the role of institutions, we expect clarity of the rules governing 
interaction, and transparent procedures for decision-making to enhance collaborative 
innovation. Clarity of rules enhances collaborative innovation because it helps to reduce 
uncertainty and tensions and to build trust in the fairness of the collaborative process and 
the ability of the participants to influence the more or less innovative outcomes of the 
collaborative process (see the literature on rules in networks: Klijn, 2001; Koppenjan & 
Klijn, 2004; Ostrom, Gardner, Walker, & Walker, 1994). Finally, transparent decision- 
making is also conducive for collaborative innovation as it helps to ensure fairness and 
accountability and thus prevent that the collaborative arena is captured by a small group 
of actors aiming to further their own interests at the expense of other actors or the wider 
community (see the literature on the importance of transparency: Hood & Heald, 2006; 
Klijn & Koppenjan, 2014).
Second, as hinted above, leadership may assume different roles that help initiating and 
sustaining collaboration and stimulating innovation (Crosby and Bryson, 2010; Morse, 
2010, Silvia and McGuire, 2010). The most proactive leadership roles supporting colla-
borative innovation are: 1) the convener role that aims to bring relevant and affected 
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actors to the table by means of clarifying and emphasizing the interdependence, aligning 
their goals and building relations of trust in the face of diverging interests; 2) the 
stewardship role that seeks to protect the collaborative process from external pressures 
and attempts to either undermine or highjack the process and thus makes it worthwhile 
for potential participants to spend time and energy on the collaborative endeavor to spur 
innovation; 3) the mediator role that helps resolving or mediating conflicts by creating 
boundary objects, acting as a translator between actors with different views and voca-
bularies and establishing a common ground for creating problem-solving; and 4) the 
catalyst role that stimulates innovation by inviting new actors into the process, soliciting 
new and disruptive knowledge, and advancing different forms of risk management. These 
different leadership roles may be applied in different parts of the collaborative innovation 
process, but since such processes are often complex and chaotic and full of overlaps, 
jumps and iterations, they may also be used simultaneously.
On the basis of this summative review, two institutional design conditions (namely, 
clarity of rules and/or transparency of decision-making) and four leadership roles (acting 
as a convener, steward, mediator, and/or catalyst) emerge as conducive to collaborative 
novel solutions. Extant studies suggest that institutional design and leadership factors 
may complement each other and jointly spur collaborative innovation since they provide 
a way to deal with the challenge of generating diversity and establishing a common 
ground (Ansell & Torfing, 2014; Sørensen; Torfing, 2016, 2016). Theoretically, we expect 
that institutional rules provide a basis for dealing with this tension, but in the absence of 
these rules leadership will be needed to manage this tension.
Consequently, we embrace the idea that it is a combination of institutional design 
conditions and leadership roles produce successful collaborative innovation outcomes 
and to deal with the tension between nurturing the diversity of views, ideas and forms of 
knowledge while aiming to establish a common ground for joint learning (‘taming the 
snake in paradise’). We expect that each of these institutional design and leadership 
conditions individually is necessary for collaborative innovation outcomes to occur. 
What remains to be explored is how these factors combine, and which combinations 
are sufficient to sustain collaborative innovation and produce public value.
3. Research methods
In order to explore how institutional design conditions (clarity of rules and/or transpar-
ency of decision-making) and leadership roles (acting as convener, steward, mediator 
and/or catalyst) can differently combine, and which combinations can simultaneously 
lead to novel solutions, we studied 32 collaborative innovation networks drawn from the 
Collaborative Governance data bank.
In the following, we will first describe the empirical setting and briefly elaborate on the 
Collaborative Governance data bank. Secondly, we will present fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) 
as the analytical tool employed in this study. Thirdly, we will describe the criteria we used 
for the operationalization and calibration of conditions.
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3.1 Empirical setting and data collection
The data used in this study originate from the Collaborative Governance Data Bank. As 
explained in the introduction to this Special Issue, the Collaborative Governance Data 
Bank purports to ‘provide a collective repository for collaborative governance case 
studies from around the world. The mission of the repository is to foster rich but 
systematic medium and large-N analysis of the conditions, processes, and outcomes of 
collaborative governance’. In this sense, all cases included in the data bank are examples 
of collaborative governance, defined as ‘a collective decision-making process based on 
more or less institutionalized interactions between two or more actors that aims to 
establish common ground for joint problem solving and value creation’. The cases are 
drawn from different countries and different policy domains. At the date of the study, the 
data bank included 39 cases of collaborative governance.
For the purposes of our study, we focused on the collaborative governance cases that 
featured innovation being an objective. This led to exclude two cases from the analysis 
because the creation of innovative solutions was not among the drivers of the colla-
boration. Next, we further excluded five cases where data were not sufficiently reliable 
or were missing. These considerations led us to exclude seven cases from the analysis, 
which left us with 32 cases.
All the 32 selected cases are cases of collaborative innovation, which is defined as 
offering ‘an alternative approach to innovation that is particularly suited to the public 
sector. The public sector aims to produce public value, and both public and private actors 
(including service users and citizens) can contribute to the production of public value 
and are likely to be motivated to collaborate in its pursuit’ (Torfing, 2019, p. 2). These 
collaborations take place in several countries in Europe, North America, East Asia and 
Australasia, different policy domains (including agriculture, culture, environment, 
health, infrastructure, security, social employment, etc.), and at various jurisdictional 
level (local, regional, national, supranational, cross-border, multilevel). Table 1 displays 
the characteristics of the selected collaborative innovation cases in terms of country, 
policy domains and jurisdictional level at which the collaboration takes place. In the 
Appendix, a list of cases is provided.
Table 1. Overview of the collaborative innovation cases.
Jurisdictional level Policy domains * Countries
Local (12) Agriculture (2) Australia (3)
Regional (5) Culture (6) Canada (1)
National (4) Economy Trade (2) Colombia (1)
Education (4) Denmark (1)
Local & Multilevel (1) Environment (14) Germany (1)
Local & Regional (5) Infrastructure (5) Vietnam (1)
Local, Regional & National (2) Health (6) Italy (1)
Local, Regional & Multilevel (1) Security (5) Netherlands (10)
Local, Regional, National & Multilevel (1) Social Employment Planning (8) Norway (1)
Local, Regional, National, Cross-border & Supranational (1) Technology/Transport (1) Sweden (1) 
USA (11)
Number of cases in parenthesis 
* More than one policy domains is possible for each case
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The data result from an extensive process of collection and analysis conducted by the 
researcher who provided data. As Table 2 shows, multiple data collection methods were 
used to collect data for each case, including documentary analysis, interviews, surveys 
and participant observation. This allowed to triangulate information and provide more 
reliable data.
A scale from 1 to 5 was used to provide data for each item included in the data bank.
We chose to focus on data related to the middle of the period observed. The main criterion 
for case selection was that innovation should be an objective of the collaboration, as 
previously explained: we chose those cases that had such objective (at least) in the middle 
of the period observed because of the following reasons. The choice of the start of period may 
have been misleading, because collaborations may not have innovation as an explicit objective 
at the outset, but may develop it over time as relationships consolidate and the terms of the 
collective aims become clearer. Similarly, the choice of the end of period may have been 
misleading, as this might coincide with a stage of the collaboration where partners move to 
other priorities and innovation is not an explicit objective anymore (possibly also because it 
has already been implemented). In summary, choosing the middle of the period appears to be 
the most comprehensive option, that is the least likely to leave out cases which indeed had 
innovation as an objective of the collaboration. As a consequence, the middle of period of 
measures were used for all the conditions throughout the paper.
3.2 Fuzzy-set QCA
In order to explore how multiple combinations of factors (or configurations of condi-
tions, in QCA parlance) can produce the expected outcome, we chose to employ the 
fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin, 2000).
QCA is a set-theoretic method, based on a few basic principles (Ragin, 2000; Schneider 
& Wagemann, 2012). First, it conceives the conditions and the outcome as a set. Cases are 
therefore assigned as members or nonmembers of a set (the process of assigning cases in 
a set is labelled ‘calibration’), and the effect of each individual causal condition is measured 
as set membership. Secondly, the relationships between conditions and outcome are 
explored through a set theoretic analysis of subset relations, thus assuming interconnection 
among conditions as the rule rather than the exception (Ragin, 2008). Thirdly, results 
coming from a set-theoretic method shed light on the existence of causal complexity. 
Causality is complex because of conjunctural causation (i.e. conditions combine to produce 
an outcome), equifinality (i.e. there may be more than one pathway to a given outcome), 
and asymmetry (i.e. the same outcome may be produced by the presence as well as the 
absence of a certain condition, depending on its combination with other conditions) 
(Misangyi et al., 2017; Ragin, 2008). Last but not least, the shift to set-subset relationships 
Table 2. Data collection.
Number of cases Data collection
12 Documents and Interviews
10 Documents and Interviews and Observations
3 Documents and Interviews and Survey
4 Documents and Interviews and Observations and Survey
1 
1
Interviews and Observations 
Documents and Survey
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allows researchers to explore necessity and sufficiency in causal relationships: conditions 
are necessary for those situations where each time the outcome is present, the condition is 
also present; conditions are sufficient in those situations where each time the condition is 
present, the outcome is also present. In this perspective, in contrast with conventional 
regression approaches, which focus on the net effects of individual independent variables 
(conditions in QCA parlance) on an outcome, QCA allows to identify multiple causal 
‘recipes’ (Ragin, 2000, 2008) simultaneously associated with an outcome. In our case, this 
corresponds to identify multiple combinations of institutional design conditions and 
leadership behaviors that simultaneously produce innovative solutions. In this perspective, 
it is apparent how the QCA approach is particularly well suited to our study.
On top of it, QCA is particularly apt to analyze medium-N samples, like the one in our 
study (Ragin, 2009).
In this work, we adopt fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) (Ragin, 2009), which allows research-
ers to calibrate partial membership in sets using values in the interval between 0 (non- 
membership) and 1 (full membership). In this way, ‘fsQCA allows to include more 
information in the analysis, distinguishing between differences among cases both in 
kind and in degree. This results in a higher content validity’ (Schneider & Wagemann, 
2012; Warsen et al., 2019, p. 6).
3.3 Operationalization and calibration
In order to determine the cases’ membership in the sets representing the outcome and the 
conditions, a process of ‘calibration’ is needed; this requires the identification of thresh-
olds (or ‘anchors’) that allow us to distinguish which cases can be considered to be fully in 
or fully out of the set under consideration, and the cross-over point of maximum 
ambiguity regarding membership of a case in the set of interest (Greckhamer, Furnari, 
Fiss, & Aguilera, 2018). Empirical and theoretical knowledge of the cases are relied upon 
to define these anchors (Ragin, 2000, 2008).
Conditions and outcomes originate from the Collaborative Governance Data Bank. 
Table 3 displays the items of the collaborative data bank used to measure each condition 
and the outcome.
As mentioned above, the anchors for calibration should be determined to the extent 
possible on the basis of theoretical and/or empirical knowledge (Ragin, 2000, 2008). 
However, given the characteristics of our dataset, and given that we have no theoretical 
and/or contextual reason to support another calibration, we decided to use properties of 
our sample to determine the anchors (as done, e.g. by Greckhamer, 2016). In order to 
identify the thresholds for the calibration, we, therefore, relied on Tosmana,1 a software 
often used for QCA which provides a threshold-setter. This can be used to set and adapt 
thresholds while viewing the data distribution, and may, therefore, assist in finding the 
correct thresholds in the calibration process of a QCA (Cronqvist, 2003). We adopted the 
thresholds suggested by the threshold-setter. Table 4 below lists the thresholds we 
adopted for the calibration of the conditions and of the outcome.
1Cronqvist, Lasse. (2017). Tosmana [Version 1.6]. University of Trier. Internet: https://www.tosmana.net.
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4. Findings from the qualitative comparative analysis
In order to perform the fsQCA, we used the fs/QCA 2.5/3.0 software (Ragin, 2006).2 As 
recommended, we first performed an analysis of necessity in order to explore the presence 
of conditions that are necessary for the outcome. A condition is necessary when each time 
the outcome occurs, the condition is also present (Ragin, 2006). Secondly, we performed 
an analysis of sufficiency in order to identify conditions, or combinations of conditions, 
that are sufficient for the outcome occurrence. A condition is sufficient when each time the 
condition is present, the outcome is also present (Ragin, 2006).
4.1 Analysis of necessity
The first step in the QCA procedure is to perform an analysis of necessity. The aim is to 
ascertain whether any of the conditions are necessary for causing the outcome, or 
whether the outcome occurs only when one of the conditions is present. This implies 
looking, first, at the conditions’ consistency scores, which measure the degree to which 
Table 3. Operationalization of conditions and outcomes.
Conditions and 
outcome Items from the data bank (Likert scale from 1 to 5)
Label in the 
QCA analysis
Clarity of rules 24. To what extent were the procedural ground rules for the collaboration 
clearly explicated by and for the participants? (1 = Very little articulation of 




27. To what extent were the decision-making processes in the key 
collaborative forums transparent? (1 = Rarely clear to participants how 
decisions were taken, 5 = Almost always clear)
TRASP
Convener 32. To what extent was the leadership effective in convening/bringing 
together the relevant and affected actors (1 = Highly ineffective, 
5 = Highly effective)
CONV
Steward 33. To what extent was the leadership effective in guarding the focus and 
integrity of the collaborative process intended in this case? (1 = Highly 
ineffective, 5 = Highly effective)
STW
Mediator 34. To what extent was the leadership effective in resolving or mitigating 
conflicts between actors? (1 = Highly ineffective, 5 = Highly effective)
MED
Catalyst 35. To what extent was the leadership effective in creating and realizing 
concrete opportunities for creative problem-solving resolving? (1 = Highly 
ineffective, 5 = Highly effective)
CAT
Innovative solutions 55.3. To what extent did the collaboration produce the following outputs or 
outcomes? Create innovative solutions in existing policies, programs, 
practices (1 = Very low, 5 = Very high).
INNSOL
Table 4. Calibration of conditions and outcome.
Conditions and outcome Full non-membership Crossover point Full membership
CLA 2 3 4
TRASP 2.75 3.5 4.25
CONV 2.75 3.5 4.25
STW 2 3 4
MED 2 3 4
CAT 2 3 4
INNSOL 2 3 4
2Ragin & Davey. 2014. Fs/QCA (Computer Program), Version (2.5/3.0). Irvine, CA: University of California.
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the cases support the following rule: the more cases that fail to meet this rule for 
necessary conditions, the lower will be the consistency score (Ragin, Drass, & Davey, 
2006). The commonly accepted consistency threshold is 0.9 (Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop, 
& Paunescu, 2010): any condition featuring consistency scores above this score, in their 
presence or absence, should be subject to closer scrutiny, as a possibly necessary condi-
tion for the outcome to occur. Secondly, the coverage scores need to be taken into 
consideration. The coverage for necessary conditions may be interpreted as a measure 
of the relevance of a necessary condition, with high values indicating relevance, and low 
values indicating trivialness. As a consequence, relevant necessary conditions should not 
only pass the consistency test but should also display a high coverage. On the other hand, 
given that coverage measure for necessity captures only one source of trivialness, a better 
approach to evaluate the relevance of necessary conditions involves also computing the 
Relevance of Necessity (RoN) parameter (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).
Table 5 above shows that no conditions can be considered as necessary for the 
outcome, as the consistency threshold is below the 0.9 scores. Further considerations 
about the coverage values or the RoN parameter are then not required. Hence, neither 
any of the design conditions nor any of leadership conditions are necessary for the 
production of collaborative innovation outcomes.
4.2 Analysis of sufficiency
The subsequent step involves performing an analysis of sufficiency. Through a process of 
minimization, the analysis of sufficiency produces a simpler equation for the conditions, 
or combinations of conditions (configurations in QCA parlance), leading to the expected 
outcome (the so-called ‘minimal formula’). It explains which configurations are sufficient 
for the outcome.
First, the analysis of sufficiency requires the construction of the Truth Table (Ragin, 
2000, 2008), which displays all logically possible causal combinations of the six condi-
tions (see Table 6) and assigns the empirical cases to one of these configurations.
We selected 1 as frequency threshold, corresponding to the minimum number of cases 
that must be observed for each configuration in order for it to be considered relevant for 
purposes of causal analysis of sufficiency. We set the frequency threshold equal to 1 as 
this is normally the case with small-medium samples (Ragin, 2008). A consistency cut-off 














Note: the ~ sign indicates absence of the condition
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also needs to be defined. Consistency describes the proportion of cases exhibiting any 
particular configuration leading to the expected outcome. Following Ragin (2008), who 
recommends a consistency cut-off higher than 0.75, we adopted a consistency threshold 
equal to 0.8 since this corresponds to a drop in the consistency scores that is visible in our 
data (Vis, 2009).
Anyway, we did not base our decisions about which causal combinations to include 
in the minimization process only on the consistency threshold. We conducted a much 
more finely grained analysis of the Truth Table. As Table 6 reveals, fixing the con-
sistency cut-off at 0.8 leaves us with eight configurations for the analysis. Four 
combinations exhibit a raw consistency of 1. Four configurations (rows 5, 6, 7, 8) 
exhibit an imperfect raw consistency (raw consistency <1), even if higher than the 
selected threshold of 0.8. This leaves room for contradictions. In other words, this 
means that among the cases displaying such configurations there are cases that exhibit 
a negative outcome (contradictions). In order to better explore the nature of such 
contradictions and see whether there is deviant case consistency in kind (true logical 
contradictions), we plot each row against the outcome. Only row 8 exhibits one case 
that is a true logical contradiction (case J – The Statewide Steering Committee to 
Reduce Family Violence in Victoria, Australia). Normally, if true logical contradictions 
do occur, the row should be excluded from the minimization process. Nevertheless, 
here the decision is less clear-cut. The other 11 cases displaying such combination of 
conditions and outcome are not true logical contradictions. As case J is the only Case 
with a serious inconsistency, we considered the qualitative data, together with the 
relevant scores at the start and at the end of the period under study, to reach an 
informed decision.
Case J relates to the establishment of a multi-agency Committee in charge of devising 
and implementing an effective strategy to reduce family violence in the state of Victoria, 
Australia. While there was no formal goal-setting process at the beginning, with attention 
devoted mainly to relationship-building, over time the Committee began to conceptualize 
an integrated response to family violence. This, in turn, led to the creation of an integrated 
service delivery model, and the establishment of a state-wide Family Violence Advisory 
Committee along with regional and local Governance Committees to facilitate cooperation 
Table 6. Truth table.







1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 S (Cons: 1,0000)
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 E (Cons: 1,0000)
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 X, AD (Cons: 1,0000)
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 V, AF (Cons: 1,0000)
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 0.974843 0.965015 A, G, AB (Cons: 0,9748)
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 0.963746 0.95539 F, N, T (Cons: 0,9637)
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0.865385 0.706587 AA, AC (Cons: 0,8654)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 0.859155 0.818436 C, D, J, L, M, O, P, R, U, W, Y, AE (Cons: 
0,8592)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.75 0.226415 Q (Cons: 0,7500)
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.746412 0.345679 B, I (Cons: 0,7464)
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.553398 0.178572 Z (Cons: 0,5534)
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0.504854 0.30137 H (Cons: 0,5049)
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.425287 0.253731 K (Cons: 0,4253)
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and ensure consistency. The case describes the creation and implementation of a family 
violence response system that was actually perceived as ‘a model’ for other states.
Moreover, the analysis of the scores of Case J for the outcome measure (extent to 
which the collaboration produced innovative solutions in existing policies, programs, 
practices) confirms that the score assigned at the end of the period (3 out of 5) is higher 
than the corresponding score at the beginning and in the middle of the period (1 in both 
instances). Therefore, we may conclude that Case J performs quite well, and just falls out 
of the set of high performance because significant collaborative innovation outputs only 
emerged at the end of the period. Therefore, we decided to include the relevant truth 
table row in the minimization process. As a consequence, we maintained all the eight 
configurations for the minimization process.
The minimization process may yield three possible solutions: (i) a ‘complex’ solution 
that avoids using any counterfactual cases (rows without cases, or logical remainders); (ii) 
a ‘parsimonious’ solution, which permits the use of any remainder that will yield simpler 
(or fewer) recipes; and (iii) an ‘intermediate solution’, which uses only the remainders 
that survive counterfactual analysis based on theoretical and substantive knowledge 
(which is input by the user). We opted for the complex solution as it does not rest on 
any assumptions about the logical remainders (i.e. configurations that are not empirically 
observed) and is the subset of all the other solution terms. In producing it, the researcher 
refrains from making assumptions about any logical remainders and is exclusively guided 
by the empirical information at hand (Ragin, 2009; Schneider and Wagemann (2012)).
The solution is expressed by the following minimal formula:
~TRASP*STW*MED*CAT +                                        
CLA*STW*MED*CAT+                                           
CONV*STW*MED*CAT +                                         
CLA*~TRASP*~CONV*STW*CAT => INNSOL                          
The * sign indicates the logical operator ‘and’, and the + sign indicates the operator 
‘or’; the tilde sign (~) is used to indicate negation or absence of a condition. The notation 
=> denotes the logical implication operator.
In other words, four paths leading to novel solutions are identified (see Table 7 below). 
The overall solution coverage is 0.747531, showing that the 74% of innovative solutions 
are explained by the four paths, and the solution consistency is 0.921164, indicating that 
92% of the empirical data presenting the four configurations are innovative. The inter-
mediate solution is identical to the complex solution. Only the parsimonious solution 
presents some differences.
Two additional measures may be used to assess the fit of each configuration: raw 
consistency and raw coverage.
Raw consistency refers to the proportion of empirical data consistent with the 
expected outcome, while raw coverage measures the proportion of instances of the 
outcome that exhibits a certain causal combination or path (Fiss, 2007, 2011). 
A solution or path is informative when its consistency is above 0.75–0.80, and its raw 
coverage is higher than 0.25 (Urueña & Hidalgo, 2016): all our configurations exhibit 
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a consistency score above 0.80, and three configurations (n. 1, 2 and 3) exhibit a raw 
coverage above 0.25 (configuration n. 4 has a raw coverage of 0.096608). As the coverage 
of configuration n. 4 is lower than the commonly accepted threshold of 0.25, we decided 
to exclude this configuration from the interpretation. It is in fact not very informative.
The solution shows that the activities of catalyst and steward appear to be INUS 
conditions (i.e. insufficient but necessary parts of causal recipes which are themselves 
unnecessary but sufficient), as they characterize all four configurations. This is reason-
able, as the catalyst works towards creating and realizing concrete opportunities for 
creative problem-solving, whereas the steward ensures that all the relevant interests are 
taken into consideration, and that certain interests do not prevail over others.
Configuration n. 3 seems to suggest that, to the extent that all four leadership roles are 
present and combine, clarity of rules and transparency of decision-making do not matter 
for a successful outcome, i.e. the production of innovative solutions, to occur. Hands-on 
leadership apparently compensates the absence of hands-off institutional design.
Conversely, configurations n. 1 and 2 suggest that the role of the convener may not be 
relevant in combination with certain institutional design features.
Configuration n. 2 may apply to those cases where the rules that govern the collabora-
tion have been set clearly and shared effectively, so that: (i) all the relevant and affected 
actors have been made aware of the opportunity or requirement to participate, and (ii) 
their participation was successfully enabled by the presence of those same rules, in 
combination with the leadership activities of steward, catalyst, and mediator. In addition 
to the presence of a steward and catalyst, the mediator here may be important to resolve 
conflicts between actors, thereby suggesting that rules alone may not be enough to set the 
terms of an effective collaboration among diverse actors. Tensions and conflicting views 
may arise – and may even be beneficial to the innovative process – but they need to be 
reconciled for the collaboration not to be irreparably disrupted.
Configuration n. 1, on the other hand, applies to those cases where transparency of 
decision-making is absent. Here a mediator may also be critical for a successful outcome 
(together with a steward and catalyst) as these non-transparent decision-making pro-
cesses may cause distrust among actors and the perception that their views are not taken 
into adequate consideration. This may occur irrespective of the presence or absence of 
Table 7. Overview of the configurations leading to innovation through collaboration.




STW ● ● ● ●
MED ● ● ●
CAT ● ● ● ●
Raw coverage 0.350365 0.488192 0.617003 0.096608
Unique coverage 0.038643 0.046372 0.051954 0.019751
Consistency 0.985507 0.887588 0.914122 1.000000
Cases with greater than 0.5 
membership in term:
F, G, A, N, T, E, 
X, AB, AD
C, Y, AF, T, R, P, M, N, O, L, J, 
F, U, V, W, E, AE, D
A, C, Y, W, R, G, N, T, P, M, F, O, L, 
J, U, D, AA, AB, AC, AE
E, S
Solutions coverage: 0.747531 Solution Consistency: 0.921164 
Frequency cut-off: 1 Consistency cut-off: 0.8 
Complex solution 
Legend: Black circles represent the presence of a causal condition, and white circles represent the negation of a causal 
condition. Blank cells represent irrelevant conditions.
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clear rules, insofar as the actors perceive that they are not respected. The mediator here 
works to ensure that perceptions of unfairness do not arise and/or are addressed 
properly, so that, as in the previous case, the collaboration does not suffer disruption 
because of growing distrust.
These three configurations suggest that our selected institutional design features may 
play quite different roles for the production of collaborative innovations, when combined 
with the four different forms of leadership. At the extreme, they do not play any role 
when the combination of all four leadership behaviors is are present (configuration n. 3). 
On the other hand, our results suggest that certain combinations of leadership behaviors 
may be crucial in combination with certain institutional design features that produce 
unexpected and/or adverse consequences. This may be the case, for instance, when clear 
rules are present but not sufficient to ensure effective collaboration (n. 2), or when non- 
transparent decision-making risks to endanger that collaboration (n.1). The convener 
may or may not be present in the cases that correspond to configurations 1 and 2, but the 
convener does not play a role for collaborative innovation to occur: what counts is 
a combination of the three other activities, which succeed in steering the collaboration 
in an effective way while keeping disruptive forces under control.
Closer study of the configurations reveals that only six cases with innovative solutions 
are uniquely covered cases: they hold a membership value higher than 0.5 in only one 
sufficient path (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Cases X and AD are only covered by 
configuration 1, and cases AF and V only hold a membership value higher than 0.5 in 
configuration 2. For configuration 3 these cases are AA and AC. This results in a low 
unique coverage for each configuration. Only 3.86%, 4.63% and 5.19% of the outcome are 
explained specifically by the three paths, respectively. In other words, the three config-
urations partially overlap. Most cases have a membership higher than 0.5 in multiple 
configurations. Except for case E, all the other cases are always explained by configuration 
3. Therefore, configuration 3 consists of a mix of cases where all the selected leadership 
behaviors are enacted.
What makes a difference between the cases covered by configuration n. 3 is the role 
played by the institutional frameworks.
In some cases, the absence of transparency of decision-making makes the convener 
role not relevant and requires the exercise of leadership as mediator, stewardship and 
catalyst (this is the case of cases covered simultaneously by paths 1 and 3). Case N (Area 
C, congestion charge zone in Milan, Italy) is an example of this, as part of the objects and 
of the actors of decision-making evolved during the course of the project based on 
emerging needs. In fact, Area C was launched with just a basic system of rules, with 
the understanding that its development would be carried out based on actual citizens’ 
and stakeholders’ behavior and necessities. It soon became clear that the self- 
identification of affected actors was more effective and efficient than identification by 
the municipal administration, and the role of the convener was simply not required. On 
the other hand, the other three leadership roles clearly played a role in this case, as the 
Municipality needed to ensure that all the requests by various stakeholders be considered 
and processed appropriately (stewardship), that complaints by citizens and even intra- 
Municipality conflicts be addressed effectively (mediator role), and that creative solutions 
to accommodate citizens’ needs be devised as extensively as possible (catalyst role).
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In other cases, it is the presence of clarity of rules that combines with the mediator, 
steward and catalyst activities (these are cases covered simultaneously by paths 2 and 3). 
Case M (collaborative policy-making committees in Gentofte, Denmark), for example, 
was governed by a written mandate that defined the policy problem calling for an 
innovative solutions, the type of solution requested by the city council, the previous 
policies and decisions to be respected in the collaborative innovation process, and the 
deadline for presenting the result in the City Council. The mandate also detailed the kind 
of actors to be invited into the collaborative policy-making committee that was in charge 
of developing a new youth policy. Since the committee brought together 10 young people 
and five established politicians, mediation was clearly needed. Public administrators with 
professional experience as facilitators served as mediators and they also took on the 
stewardship role of ensuring that everybody was heard and protected the integrity of the 
innovation process. Finally, they used brainstorming, invited external guest and orga-
nized innovation camps in order to disturb the committee members and encourage them 
to think out of the box. The catalyst role was important because the traditional meeting 
format in a dull room in the City Hall seemed to discourage creativity. Similarly, case 
W (Infant Mortality CoIIN) illustrates the importance of the presence of all four roles of 
steward, convener, mediator, and catalyst. The goal of the Infant Mortality CoIIN 
(CoIIN = Collaborative Improvement and Innovation Network) was to reduce disparities 
in infant mortality among the different segments of the US population. The project was 
started by the head of the Maternal and Child Health Bureau of the Obama administra-
tion. He assumed the role of convener by bringing together government health officials of 
all states of the US as participants in the project. He succeeded in mediating potential 
conflicts among the different states to keep the project nationwide on track. The leader-
ship team was also successful as a steward, keeping the focus on reducing infant mortality 
for disadvantaged parts of the US population for the entire duration of the project. The 
catalyst function was maintained by combining innovative approaches for learning – 
using the IHI breakthrough series (The Breakthrough Series: IHI’s Collaborative Model 
for Achieving Breakthrough Improvement, 2003) which provides an institutional frame-
work for organizational learning – with the concept of Collaborative Innovation 
Networks (COIN) (Gloor, 2006) to develop innovative solutions for instance for addres-
sing social determinants of health and childhood trauma.
5. Discussion
We started our exploration of public innovation outcomes by proposing that both 
institutional design and leadership provide plausible strategies for dealing with the 
challenge of having both a diversity of actors and a common ground for managing 
differences and developing and implementing new and promising solutions. The 
research findings highlight that for public innovation projects to succeed, it seems that 
the exercise of hands-on leadership is more important than governing collaboration 
hands-off through institutional rules. Based on our analysis of 32 cases from around the 
world, on the local, regional, national and supranational level, in areas as diverse as 
agriculture, culture, education, environmental protection, and health, we find that it is 
not really necessary to have clear rules at the beginning of the project. What matters 
much more is the key role of the steward responsible for protecting the integrity of the 
608 J. TORFING ET AL.
collaboration, the mediator that helps to resolve conflicts or turn them into constructive 
learning and the catalyst that encourages the actors to think out of the box. It is also not 
really necessary to make the decision-making rules transparent while the project is 
ongoing. However, what is key is to have trusted and trustworthy leadership that is 
capable of creating an environment where the goals and the focus of the collaboration 
process are maintained, conflicts are mediated and the actors are encouraged to think out 
of the box. In the absence of transparent rules, the presence of a mediator is critical to the 
production of successful outcomes. When the collaborative innovation process is based 
on clear rule, the convener role seems to be unimportant.
The limited importance of clear and transparent rules in public decision-making runs 
counter to conventional democratic values that tend to highlight the importance of clear 
ground rules and transparent decision-making as a condition for fairness. This may suggest 
a trade-off between democracy and the production of innovative solutions to pressing 
problems. As long as there is a competent leadership of collaborative processes, they may 
produce innovative outcomes even if there are no rules to ensure the democratic quality of 
the process. However, similar results have been found in prior work, for instance by de Fine 
Licht (2011), and also Levy (2007) who observed that non-transparent decision-making 
might lead to legitimate outcomes that work and enjoy widespread support.
The key implication of our findings for public leaders is that the success of collaborative 
innovation projects is based on ‘soft’ factors such as trusted and trustworthy leadership. 
Besides the role of the steward, it is one of the catalysts which also seems to be a common 
success factor of the observed cases. While the role of the steward centers on guarding the 
focus and integrity of the collaboration process, the catalyst provides concrete opportunities 
for creative problem solving by providing an ‘appropriate disturbance’ that helps the actors 
to escape the dangers of tunnel vision and group think. Conflict mediation is also a key to 
success, especially when there is a lack of transparent rules, and if there are neither clear nor 
transparent rules, the convener roles also seem to be important.
Rather than relying on a set of clear and transparent rules that could possibly be codified, 
formalized and imbedded in a standardized framework for publicly initiated, or even legally 
mandated, innovation networks, public leaders must become competent conveners, stew-
ards, mediators and catalysts. Learning to lead collaborative innovation process may appear 
challenging since most of them are trained in transactional and transformative leadership 
of their employees and have limited experience with leading processes of multi-actor 
collaboration aiming to produce innovative public value outcomes.
6. Conclusion
This paper aims to enhance our theoretical understanding of the role of institutional design 
and leadership on the production of successful collaborative innovation outcomes. We 
proposed that both institutional design and leadership may help dealing with the tension – 
which we prosaically referred to as ‘taming the snake in paradise’ – between fostering and 
maintaining enough diversity to stimulate learning and innovation and creating a common 
ground for multi-actor collaboration that enables compromise formation agreement and 
joint implementation of new and promising solutions. As such, we aimed to answer the 
following question: How do different forms of institutional design and leadership combine 
to produce pathways to collaborative innovation of public value?
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On the basis of an fsQCA analysis of 32 cases drawn from the Collaborative 
Governance Data Bank, we established four pathways to collaborative innovation of 
public value that consists of different combinations of clear and/or transparent rules and 
four different leadership roles. Our research helped to nuance the theoretical expectation 
that institutional rules provide a basis for dealing with this tension, but in the absence of 
these rules, leadership will be needed to manage this tension and identify specific path-
ways. We can draw three specific conclusions about these pathways. The first conclusion 
is that the steward and catalyst leadership roles are an element in each pathway and thus 
important for realizing collaborative innovation outcomes. The second conclusion is 
that, when a combination of all four leadership roles is present, the two selected institu-
tional design features do not matter for novel solutions to occur. The third conclusion is 
that the convener role is not important when there is a relative absence of certain 
institutional design features.
These conclusions extend our understanding of the role of institutional design and 
leadership in collaborative innovation (Hartley, 2005; Blomqvist & Levy, 2006; Bommert, 
2010; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011; Torfing, 2019). They confirm and nuance the idea that 
we need to understand leadership and institutional design as complementary conditions 
for realizing collaborative innovation outcomes. An additional conclusion is that the 
absence of rules ensuring transparency may be conducive to collaborative innovation. 
This conclusion fits the idea that innovation thrives on a certain isolation from the 
outside world. This finding has been firmly established in the literature on strategic niche 
management (Kemp, Schot, & Hoogma, 1998; Schot & Geels, 2008), but needs to be 
developed further in the literature on collaborative innovation in the public sector. In 
further developing these insights, researchers will also need to consider the fundamental 
role of transparency in democracy (Hood & Heald, 2006; Meijer, 2013).
How do our analysis and finding help practitioners to spur collaborative innovation in 
the face of the pervasiveness of wicked problem and unmet social needs? Our paper 
highlight that practitioners need to acknowledge the tension between the need for 
diversity and the need for common ground: collaborative innovation is not an easy 
path and framed in a metaphorical way, the snake in paradise needs to be tamed. This 
requires leadership. The research highlights that establishing leadership in the form of 
the various roles discussed here is crucial to collaborative innovation outcomes since 
these multi-actor processes often take place in the absence of rules. Leadership must 
always consist of stewardship and catalyzing facilitation. Clear rules may help and reduce 
the need for the convener role. These forms of leadership require the utmost attention 
since they are key conditions for successful collaborative innovation.
This exploration of the role of institutional design and leadership in collaborative 
innovation also generates a new set of questions. A first question concerns the interaction 
between institutional design and leadership over time. Longitudinal analyses can result in 
a better understanding of the interaction between these two components over time. Are 
rules developed and does this result in other forms of leadership? A second question 
concerns the role of context. A comparative case analysis can result in a better under-
standing of the relation between (institutional) context and the role of institutional 
design and leadership. A final question revolves around the role of transparency. What 
our analysis cannot answer, and what we have to defer to future research, is if too much 
transparency might even be detrimental to successful public innovation initiatives.
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The results of this paper highlight that a fuzzy-set qualitative case analysis can help to 
develop a firm theoretical understanding of the role of different factors in collaborative 
innovation. This type of analysis helps researchers to zoom in and zoom out on certain 
patterns and therefore develop a clearer view on patterns of collaborative innovation that 
have their idiosyncratic dynamics in each individual case. Our analysis shows that these 
patterns are nuanced but can still be understood in theoretical terms based on principles 
from set theory. This type of analysis provides a way forward in developing mature 
theories of collaborative innovation. On the other hand, our fuzzy-set analysis is not 
without limitations. The analysis is developed on the basis of 32 cases and 6 conditions; it 
produces 13 combinations out of the 64 that are theoretically possible, and one of the 
successful combination in the Truth Table reflects 12 (of the 32) cases. This sheds light on 
the limited diversity issue and the treatment of the logical remainders. Whereas this 
needs to be highlighted as part of the analysis, it is worthwhile to remember that the 
presence of limited diversity is more of a rule than an exception, as social phenomena 
tend to occur in clusters, and this naturally leads to logical remainders. Moreover, despite 
this single cluster of cases within one row, the remaining cases are widely distributed 
across 12 other combinations: this allowed us to perform a purposeful analysis, and to 
obtain a meaningful solution. The resulting four paths contribute to a better under-
standing of how institutional design principles and leadership roles may be instrumental 
in the pursuit of successful collaborative innovation outcomes.
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Appendix. List of cases.
CASES Case
1 A Australian collaboration to develop front-of-pack food labelling policy
2 B Independent Inquiry into Container Deposit Legislation in NSW
3 C Blackfoot Challenge (Montana, USA)
4 D Desert Tortoise Habitat Conservation Planning
5 E Joint Committee for Counterterrorism of the Dutch national government agencies
6 F Community Enterprise Het Klokhuis
7 G Community Enterprise De meevaart
8 H Collaborative governance in Vietnam flooding
9 I Chinchina Besin Management Plan
10 J The Statewide Steering Committee to Reduce Family Violence in Victoria, Australia
11 K Homelessness policy development and program funding in Vancouver, Canada
12 L public-private-people collaboration in peri-urban area development; Netherlands
13 M collaborative policy making committees in Gentofte; Denmark
15 N Area C – Milan
17 O Baker River Hydroelectric Project
18 P Delaware Inland Bays
19 Q Narragansett Bay (RI)
20 R Rhode Island’s Salt Ponds
21 S Lake Tahoe
22 T Tampa Bay
23 U Tillamook Bay, Oregon
24 V Foodborne disease outbreak in Germany
25 W Infant Mortality CoIIN
26 X Living Lab Stratumseind
27 Y Friends of Redington Pass
28 Z Local Network for Combating Illiterarcy (City A, The Netherlands)
29 AA Local Network for Combating Illiterarcy (City B, The Netherlands)
32 AB Revitalisation of Central Dandenong, Melbourne
34 AC Okay, here’s how it goes (Fight Against Organized Crime, Motorcycle Club)
36 AD The ‘Neighborhood Renewal Program’, City of Stockholm
37 AE Collaborative policy making committees in Svelvik Municipality, Norway
39 AF Wanted Partners (Fight Against Organized Crime, Human Trafficking)
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